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Voluntary Palliated Starvation: A Lawful and Ethical Way to Die? 
Ben White, Lindy Willmott and Julian Savulescu∗ 
 
Abstract 
Increasingly, individuals want control over their own destiny.  This includes the way in which 
they die and the timing of their death.  The desire for self-determination at the end of life is 
one of the drivers for the ever-increasing number of jurisdictions overseas that are legalising 
voluntary euthanasia and/or assisted suicide, and for the continuous attempts to reform 
state and territory law in Australia.  Despite public support for law reform in this field, 
legislative change in Australia is unlikely in the near future given the current political 
landscape.  We argue that there may be another solution which provides competent adults 
with control over their death and to have any pain and symptoms managed by doctors, but 
which is currently lawful and consistent with prevailing ethical principles.  ‘Voluntary 
palliated starvation’ refers to the process which occurs when a competent individual chooses 
to stop eating and drinking, and receives palliative care to address pain, suffering and 
symptoms that may be experienced by the individual as he or she approaches death.  In this 
article, we argue that, at least in some circumstances, such a death would be lawful for the 
individual and doctors involved, and consistent with principles of medical ethics. 
 
Introduction 
Voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide are a source of ongoing discussion at both federal1 and 
state level in Australia.2  Despite this agitation for change, apart from a brief period in the Northern 
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1 For example, before the 2013 Federal Election, the Voluntary Euthanasia Party was formed and had seven 
candidates, with two Senate candidates standing in each of the Australian Capital Territory, New South Wales 
and South Australia, and one candidate standing for a lower house seat in the Northern Territory: ‘Euthanasia 
Party Launches Candidates’, news.com.au (online), 19 August 2013 
<http://www.news.com.au/national/breaking-news/euthanasia-party-launches-candidates/story-e6frfku9-
1226699930838?from=public_rss> (accessed 25 February 2014).  More recently, on 10 November 2014, the 
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs tabled its final report on the Medical Services 
(Dying with Dignity) Exposure Draft Bill 2014 which was released in June 2014 by Greens Senator, Richard Di 
Natale. Since the Northern Territory euthanasia legislation, Rights of the Terminally Ill Act 1995 (NT), was 
overturned by the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997 (Cth), there have also been ongoing attempts to repeal the 
relevant Commonwealth legislation, particularly by the Australian Greens party.   
2 Over the past five years, for example, New South Wales has introduced the Rights of the Terminally Ill Bill in 
2010 (lapsed on prorogation) and 2013 (defeated 23:13); South Australia has introduced nine separate 
euthanasia Bills, the last two of which lapsed on prorogation; Tasmania has introduced the Dying with Dignity 
Bill 2009 (defeated 15:7) and the more recent Voluntary Assisted Dying Bill 2013 that was narrowly defeated 
13:11; Victoria has introduced the Medical Treatment (Physician Assisted Dying) Bill 2008 (defeated 25:13); 
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Territory, efforts to legalise assisted dying have failed.  But is there a means to achieve this same 
outcome, a comfortable death desired by a competent adult at a time of their choosing, which is 
justifiable according to current medical ethics and within the law?  One of us has elsewhere 
advanced the concept of ‘voluntary palliated starvation’ (VPS).3  This refers to when a competent 
adult refuses to eat or drink and then receives palliative care to relieve any suffering he or she 
experiences from dying due to a lack of food and water.  Of note is that this provides a means for 
people, whether or not they are terminally ill or dependent on medical treatment to survive, to die 
comfortably.   
Death resulting from a competent patient’s decision to cease eating and drinking is not a new 
concept, and has been discussed as an option for hastening death for more than two decades.4  As 
early as 1993, Bernat and his colleagues urged consideration of patient refusal of hydration and 
nutrition as an alternative to physician-assisted suicide and voluntary active euthanasia.5  At the 
same time, Bernat called for more scientific research into the physiological effects of starvation and 
dehydration so that patients would be confident that death in this way would not be accompanied 
by suffering.  There is now a body of research which provides evidence that death as a result of 
starvation and dehydration for patients who are dying may not be uncomfortable if appropriately 
managed.6  So while there has been some consideration of the situation for individuals who are 
dying, there has been less focus on this kind of death for those who are not terminally ill.   
At this point, it is useful to recount the situation of Tony Nicklinson, a man who was not terminally 
ill, but wished to die.  Tony was the applicant in Nicklinson v Ministry of Justice & Ors7 and his wife, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and finally Western Australia has introduced the Voluntary Euthanasia Bill 2010 (defeated 24:11). The various 
legislative attempts in Australia are also discussed in White B and Willmott L, “How should Australia regulate 
voluntary euthanasia and assisted suicide?” (2012) 20 JLM 410.  See also the Australia21 Report following a 
euthanasia and assisted dying roundtable in Brisbane in January 2013: Douglas B, Willmott L and White B, “The 
Right to Choose an Assisted Death: Time for Legislation?” (2013) Australia21, Weston, ACT, available at 
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/59240/ (last accessed 10 February 2014).  
3 Savulescu J, “A simple solution to the puzzles of end of life? Voluntary palliated starvation” (2014) 40 J Med 
Ethics 110. 
4 Ivanovic N, Buche D and Fringer A, “Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking at the end of life – a 
“systematic search and review” giving insight into an option of hastening death in capacitated adults at the 
end of life” (2014) 13(1) BMC Palliat Care 1.  For an overview and history of the very limited legal engagement 
on this issue, see T Pope and A West, “Legal Briefing: Voluntarily Stopping Eating and Drinking” (2014) 25 J 
Clinical Ethics 68. While there is only limited empirical evidence about the frequency with which deaths occur 
as a result of voluntarily ceasing to eat and drink, research in the Netherlands estimates that between 600 and 
2800 people die each year in that country as a result of a their decision to stop eating and drinking: Chabot BE, 
Auto-euthanasie. Verborgen stervenswegen in gesprek met naasten (Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, Amsterdam, 2007) 
and Van der Heide A et al, ‘Euthanasie en andere medische beslissingen rond het levenseinde’ (ZonMW, 11 
July 2012) as reported in Sheldon T, “Doctors should care for people who choose to die by starvation, says 
Dutch Medical Association” (2014) 348 BMJ 331. See also the findings of empirical research into the 
experience of nurses employed by hospice programs in Oregon where 33% reported that in the previous four 
years they had cared for a patient who hastened their own death by the refusal of food and fluids: Ganzini et 
al, ‘Nurses’ experiences with hospice patients who refuse food and fluids to hasten death’ (2003) 349(4) N Engl 
J Med 359. 
5 Bernat JL, Gert B and Mogielnicki RP, “Patient refusal of hydration and nutrition” (1993) 153(24) Arch Intern 
Med 2723. 
6 See, for example, Wagner B, Ersek M and Riddell S, “Hospital and Palliative Nurses Association Position 
Statement on Artificial Nutrition and Hydration in End of Life Care” (2003) available at 
http://www.hpna.org/pdf/Artifical_Nutrition_and_Hydration_PDF.pdf (last accessed 10 February 2014).  
7 [2012] EWHC 304. 
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as testatrix of his estate, was a party to the appeal to the English Court of Appeal in Nicklinson & R v 
A Primary Care Trust.8 Tony died before the appeal was heard. This litigation was commenced 
because Tony sought assistance to die as he was not in a position to kill himself and he wished to 
challenge the current law that prohibited him receiving the desired assistance.  Tony found himself 
in this situation after suffering a stroke and becoming ‘locked-in’ so that he was almost completely 
paralysed.  He relied on others for all his care needs and, while able to eat, needed to be ‘fed like a 
baby’9.  However, he was not dying nor was he terminally ill.10  Tony was competent and his decision 
to want to die was described as ‘rational’ by the court.  After being unsuccessful in the English High 
Court, Tony refused nutrition, fluids and medical treatment with the intention of dying, and he 
subsequently died of pneumonia.11  Although the media reported his widow as describing his death 
as ‘thankfully’ quick, she also said that his final 48 hours were ‘pretty unpleasant’.12   
Tony’s plight illustrates some of the issues that arise in this paper but to elucidate them more 
clearly, let us consider a revised scenario (or at least add facts to remove possible uncertainty).  Let 
us assume that Tony is not suffering from pneumonia or any other illness: his cause of death will be 
starvation and/or dehydration.  And as he starves and dehydrates, he slowly starts to feel 
discomfort, then some pain and suffering.  Let us also assume that Tony is then provided with 
palliative care to manage that pain and those symptoms as they arise.   
The key issue is the implications of making palliative care available in this situation.  As we will see, a 
competent refusal to eat and drink, even when that results in death, is not particularly controversial 
from an ethical or legal perspective. But does the provision of palliative care to manage the pain 
and/or symptoms associated with this decision alter the legal or ethical implications of this conduct?  
We argue that it need not do so and that there are cases (such as the revised Tony scenario) where 
VPS would be both lawful and ethical. 
 
Voluntary starvation by a competent adult 
Every competent adult has the right to refuse to eat and drink, and not to be force fed contrary to 
their wishes. This is a recognised ethical right and also has entrenched support in law.  
                                                          
8 [2013] EWCA Civ 961.  The wife was unsuccessful in the appeal to the English Court of Appeal. Tony’s wife 
and ‘Martin’ (another person who had ‘locked-in’ syndrome and wished to die) appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom in December 2013. The appeal was heard over four days by a nine judge panel rather 
than the traditional five. The decision was reserved. See R (on the application of Nicklinson and another) (AP) 
(Appellants) v Ministry of Justice (Respondent), Case ID UKSC 2013/0235, available at 
http://supremecourt.uk/current-cases/case_2013_0235.html. See also Jane Nicklinson and Paul Lamb’s case 
to die with dignity (21 November 2013) Bindmans LLP <http://www.bindmans.com/news-and-events/news-
article/jane-nicklinson-and-paul-lambs-case-to-die-with-dignity>. 
9 Bosley S, ‘Tony Nicklinson: fight to die with dignity ‘will not be forgotten’ The Guardian (online), 23 August 
2012 <http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/aug/22/tony-nicklinson-die-not-forgotten>. 
10 Here we say that Nicklinson was not ‘terminally ill’ in the sense that he was not dying and was capable of 
living for some time. We note, however, that in another sense he may be regarded as terminally ill in that he 
was dependent on ongoing care and artificial nutrition and hydration to continue living. 
11 [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [12]. 






The most frequently cited authority for this principle is the landmark case of Schloendorff v New York 
Hospital.13 Justice Cardozo observed that ‘[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a 
right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’14  This is also a part of the common law of 
Australia15 and is reflected in the civil and criminal law of trespass (battery) in each State and 
Territory.16  This protection of the person remains even if the course of action adopted, such as 
refusing life-sustaining treatment, will lead to death.17   
It is now well accepted in Australia (and elsewhere) that artificial nutrition and hydration are capable 
of being lawfully refused.  This has been approached often on the basis of it being a refusal of 
medical treatment, and the cases are generally in the context of incompetent adults.  At times, the 
decisions arise due to the relevant legislative framework that operated,18 but the principles at play 
are consistent with the common law.  The same principles also apply to a decision by a competent 
adult to refuse to eat and drink.  The right to bodily integrity embedded in law protects all bodily 
integrity, not just in relation to medical treatment and so protects a refusal to eat and drink and 
prevents force feeding.  We have recently seen this principle applied by the English Court of 
Protection, commenting that ‘[p]eople with capacity are entitled to make decisions for themselves, 
including about what they will and will not eat, even if their decision brings about their death’,19 and 
by the Supreme Court of South Australia in a case where the competent refusal of food and water 
was held to be lawful.20  
In recognising the common law right to refuse to eat and drink, courts have also been called upon to 
consider the corresponding liability of those who respect this refusal such as residential aged care 
facilities21 and residential disability care facilities.22  Generally this has involved considering statutory 
provisions in the relevant State and whether they alter this common law right.  Although the 
legislative framework will differ between jurisdictions, the general principles from these cases show, 
as one might expect, that respecting a competent refusal will not give rise to liability.  
One area of possible legal risk that has been suggested is whether respecting this competent refusal 
might be treated as assisting a suicide (the concept of suicide, although no longer a crime in 
Australia, has been judicially described as ‘the intentional taking of one’s own life’).23  The case of H 
                                                          
13 211 NY 125 (1914).  
14 211 NY 125 (1914) at 129. 
15 Secretary of the Department of Health and Community Services v JWB (Marion’s case) (1991) 175 CLR 218. 
16 Richards B, “General Principles of Consent to Medical Treatment” in White B, McDonald F and Willmott L 
(eds), Health Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2010) at [4.20]. 
17 Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter (2009) 40 WAR 84 at [26]; Hunter and New England Area Health Service v 
A (2009) 74 NSWLR 88 at [4]-[22]; H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352 at [35]-[36]. 
18 Re BWV; ex parte Gardner (2003) 7 VR 487. 
19 Re E (Medical Treatment: Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 at [7]. 
20 H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352 at [64]. 
21 H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352. 
22 Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter (2009) 40 WAR 84. 
23 X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320 at [59] and see also the discussion in H Ltd v J 
(2010) 107 SASR 352 [47]-[59] of the concept of suicide. Otlowski describes the traditional common law 
definition of suicide as ‘the intentional, voluntary taking of one’s own life by a person of sound mind and of the 
age of discretion’: Otlowski M, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) 
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Ltd v J24 has rejected this concern concluding, by analogy, that as refusing life-sustaining medical 
treatment is not suicide,25 nor should refusing to eat and drink be considered suicide:26 
I acknowledge that there is a difference between food and medicine. There is also a 
difference between the taking of food by natural means and the medical administration of 
nutrition. However, those differences do not appear to me to be sufficient to sustain a 
distinction between suicide and the exercise of a right to self-determination... I find that 
refusal of sustenance and medication is not suicide within the common law meaning of that 
term.  
So because a refusal to eat and drink is not suicide, one cannot be guilty of assisting a suicide by 
respecting that refusal.27 In H Ltd v J,28 Justice Kourakis (now Chief Justice) also concluded that, even 
if he was wrong and refusing to eat and drink was capable of being suicide, merely respecting a 
competent refusal would not constitute the necessary aiding, abetting or counselling of the suicide 
required under the law of that State.  Courts are likely to require at least some assistance or 
encouragement before imposing liability in this setting.29  
Indeed, a person who is respecting a competent refusal of food and fluids may, at the same time, be 
attempting to discourage, challenge or otherwise dissuade a person wishing to die. However, when 
ultimately a person is not persuaded to take food and fluid, the law requires that the person’s own 
wish over what is introduced into his or her own body be respected. 
Another possible area of legal concern is the duty on those who have charge of another to provide 
the necessaries of life, where a failure to do so would give rise to criminal responsibility for the 
person’s death.30  Here, again, the courts have concluded that where there is a lawful refusal in 
place, this duty will not arise.31  While there is some variation in the framing of this duty nationally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
p62. See also Stewart C, “Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide” in White B, McDonald F and Willmott L (eds), Health 
Law in Australia (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2010) [12.90]. 
24 (2010) 107 SASR 352. 
25 See also, for example, two recent Australian cases that have concluded that refusing life-sustaining 
treatment is not suicide: X v Sydney Children’s Hospitals Network [2013] NSWCA 320 and Re JS [2014] NSW 
302. 
26 (2010) 107 SASR 352 at [64]-[65]. 
27 We note that this view, and the reasoning in H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352, can be critiqued as inconsistent 
both as a matter of logic and legal principle.  One example of such critique (although it preceded H Ltd v J) is 
Otlowski M, Voluntary Euthanasia and the Common Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997) chap 2.  However, 
these critiques of themselves do not have force of law and so do not alter the legal position described in this 
paper. Our task is to state the law as it is likely to be, drawing upon the most applicable and relevant primary 
legal sources. 
28 (2010) 107 SASR 352. 
29 In Attorney-General v Able [1984] QB 795, Woolf J outlined the elements of the offence of aiding and 
abetting suicide under the relevant legislation at the time, and determined that a conviction required both 
intent to assist and that the deceased was assisted or encouraged to suicide. See also, for example, the 
Australian cases (sentencing remarks) of R v Maxwell [2003] VSC 278; R v Hood [2002] VSC 123; and R v Nielsen 
[2012] QSC 29.  
30 In terms of the legal duty of doctors to provide ‘necessaries of life’ and how that operates in the contexts of 
decisions to withhold or withdraw medical treatment, see Willmott L, White B and Then S, “Withholding and 
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment” in White B, McDonald F and Willmott L (eds), Health Law in 
Australia (Thomson Reuters, Sydney, 2010) at [13.20]. 
31 Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter (2009) 40 WAR 84 at [43]-[49]; H Ltd v J (2010) 107 SASR 352 at [73]-[74]. 
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(for example, some jurisdictions rely on the common law while others have it in statute), this is likely 
to be the position under Australian law. There was also an alternative argument advanced in 
Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter32 that a competent adult should not be regarded as being in the 
‘charge of another’ and so a care facility would not be subject to this duty, although we note this 
argument has been criticised.33   
Ethical considerations 
From an ethical perspective, the right of a competent adult to refuse to eat and drink could be seen 
as a basic right or derivative from the right not to have one’s body invaded or violated without 
consent. One of our most basic interests is control over our own bodies. Thus, our body should not 
be subjected to the will of another without our consent. This is so on either Kantian or 
consequentialist grounds [though Kant himself and some modern Kantians think suicide in many 
cases is morally wrong]. There is a basic moral principle of inviolability of the person: 
It is impermissible for one person, A, or several people, B-D, to insert any part of their body, 
object or substance into the body of another competent person, X, without X’s consent. 
(A more formal version is: 
It is impermissible for one person, A, or several people, B-D, to perform an act which involves 
foreseeably and avoidably inserting any part of their body, object or substance into the body 
of another competent person, X, without X’s valid consent.)34  
While it follows from this that every person has the ethical right to refuse to eat and drink, does it 
remain ethical if that refusal results in death through starvation?  
Historically, there was no property in the body. Indeed, at times, our bodies belonged to the 
Sovereign. Thus there used to exist the ancient crime of maim, which is rendering the body unfit for 
fighting (whether or not that injury is consented to).35 Others believed that our body belonged to 
God and so it was to usurp His will to prematurely take one’s own life. However, if anyone owns the 
body, it is the person who resides in it. So we have a right to end our life as we choose. The central 
ethical concept relevant to assisted dying in general is that of autonomy. Autonomy comes from the 
Greek, ‘autos’ ’nomos’ which means ‘self-governing’. Respect for autonomy is the principle that we 
should respect each individual’s own conception of what is a good life for him or her, unless he or 
she presents a direct threat of harm to other people. Each of us has a right to determine how our 
lives should go, even when those decisions appear irrational or extraordinary. 
It is respect for autonomy which grounds the justification for allowing Jehovah’s Witnesses to die by 
refusal of life-saving blood transfusion. Witnesses believe, contrary to all other Christian 
                                                          
32 (2009) 40 WAR 84. 
33 White B, Willmott L and Allen J, “Withholding and withdrawing life-sustaining treatment: Criminal 
responsibility for established medical practice?” (2010) 17 JLM 849 at 858-859. 
34 Savulescu J, “A simple solution to the puzzles of end of life? Voluntary palliated starvation” (2014) 40 J Med 
Ethics 110 at 111. 
35 See R v Brown [1993] 2 WLR 556 at 589 per Lord Mustill. See also Arthur v Arthur [1964] ALR 1021 and R v 
Woodward [1970] QWN 30. The obsolete common law crime of ‘maim’ has been subsumed into what we now 
know as grievous bodily harm and other similar non-fatal offences to the person. 
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denominations, that the Bible forbids literally the taking of blood. If they do not refuse, they believe 
they will not enjoy eternal paradise. This interpretation is unlikely to be correct given the weight of 
scholarship, even within the Christian tradition, against it. Yet nonetheless the wishes of 
autonomous Witnesses are respected. So to be allowed to die does not require that our values be 
maximally rational or universally shared. 
However, some choices do not reflect our deeply held values. Some are frivolous, influenced by 
social or peer pressure, or solely the result of addictions or depression.   From an ethical perspective, 
it may not be acceptable to respect a person’s choice to die in such circumstances.  Yet unusual 
choices are not necessarily non-autonomous. Perhaps the most unusual is the desire by the 
philosopher Michael Bayles to commit suicide. Here is a short passage from his obituary. 
Michael Bayles committed suicide August 6, 1990. He was born in Charleston, Illinois January 
21, 1941, and so died in his fiftieth year. His suicide was carefully planned and is as much an 
expression of Myke as his varied writings in ethical theory and applied ethics, philosophy of 
law, and political theory. 
Myke's argument for the moral acceptability of suicide is that, as he put it, ‘only humans can 
choose when they will die’ and that ’to fail to exercise that choice is to deprive oneself of a 
distinctive freedom’.  A person's life is a story, he suggests, and a person ought to consider 
how the story ought to end, with suicide an option under appropriate circumstances. ‘If’, he 
says, ‘what makes life a good story is happiness or the pursuit of projects, then a long, drawn 
out ending without either is a bad end of what may have been a good story’.36  
Bayles had been very productive in the years leading up to his death though he progressively took on 
fewer and fewer projects. He wanted to die without unmet obligations. 
He had, in the three years before his death, seen to publication his Principles of Law and 
what Joel Feinberg has called ‘a groundbreaking theory of procedural justice with 
applications not only to legal practices but to social institutions generally’.  And the day he 
committed suicide he received word that his book on H. L. A. Hart had been accepted for 
publication.’ 37 
Some wrote Bayles was depressed. This may have been the case. But if that depression were 
unchangeable and his valuing suicide had persisted for some time and was the result of rational 
reflection, then it may still have been an expression of his autonomy. What matters according to the 
principle of respect for autonomy is not that a person makes the right decision, but that they make 
their own decision, according to their values. 
Lisette Nigot, aged 79 and apparently healthy, also made an unusual choice.  This retired academic, 
who was living in Perth, took an overdose and died shortly before her 80th birthday.  The note that 
she left behind her bed when she died explained: ‘After 80 years of a good life, I have [had] enough 
                                                          
36 ‘Obituary’ (1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 1. 
37 ‘Obituary’ (1993) 12 Law and Philosophy 1 at 2. 
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of it.  I want to stop it before it gets bad.’38  It was important to Nigot to end her life while she was 
well and before her health deteriorated and this represented her autonomous choice. 
While autonomy is key in ethical terms, what is critical in clinical terms is whether the person is 
competent. For clinical practice, independent, competent determinations of competence are 
central. A patient refusing nutrition and hydration in order to end her life runs the risk of being 
deemed incompetent just because she wants to end her life. A patient who is terminally ill, or 
suffering from a condition like motor neurone disease, or even just tired of life is unlikely to be 
deemed incompetent and so forcibly prevented from acting on that strategy.  
Importantly, doctors can respect autonomy by providing information and argument to patients in an 
attempt to engage and perhaps even change a person’s values.39  Yet when argument and facts have 
been presented, respect for persons requires that their decisions for their own lives be respected, 
including the decision of when to end their life. 
Now if doctors, courts and family members can make a decision that a person’s life is no longer 
worth living and feeding should be stopped (as can occur legally when the patient is incompetent 
and cessation of feeding is assessed as being in the patient’s best interests), why can’t the person, 
like Tony Nicklinson, make that decision, and it be acted upon? Surely the person who has the most 
right to decide whether life is tolerable is the person who must live that life. 
Palliation in the course of voluntary starvation by a competent adult 
So to date we have made the reasonably uncontroversial claim that a person has both a legal and 
ethical right to refuse to eat and drink, even if this will lead to his or her death. And if there is a 
lawful refusal, respecting it will not attract legal liability.  In our revised scenario above, Tony may 
refuse to eat and drink and his carers would need to abide by his decision.  But dying in this way – 
through dehydration and/or starvation – can lead to suffering, particularly if the person is not 
already dying.40  In the recent English Court of Appeal decision of Nicklinson & R v A Primary Care 
Trust,41 an attempt to die by refusal to eat and drink was described as constituting the ‘most 
distressing circumstances’.42  
The dilemma that we will grapple with now is whether a person refusing to eat and drink (self-
induced starvation) should be able to receive palliative care to manage the pain and symptoms 
associated with this choice to make their dying comfortable. Does the addition of palliative care, so 
called ‘voluntary palliated starvation’ or VPS, alter the legal and ethical analysis above?  We argue 
                                                          
38 Amalfi C et al, ‘Healthy woman thanks Dr Nitschke, then kills herself’ The Sydney Morning Herald (online), 26 
November 2002 <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/11/25/1038173695743.html>. 
39 Savulescu J, “Rational Non-Interventional Paternalism: Why Doctors Ought to Make Judgements of What Is 
Best for Their Patients” (1995) 21 J Med Ethics 327; Savulescu J, “Liberal Rationalism and Medical Decision-
Making” (1997) 11 Bioethics 115; Savulescu J and Momeyer RW, “Should Informed Consent Be Based on 
Rational Beliefs?” (1997) 23 J Med Ethics 282. 
40 The authors note that there is evidence to suggest that when not eating or drinking is part of the normal 
dying process, the absence of food and drink may not result in suffering to the patient.  See further footnote 6 
(xxx) above. 
41 [2013] EWCA Civ 961. 
42 [2013] EWCA Civ 961 at [9]. 
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that the provision of palliative care, at least in the situations we contemplate as illustrated by the 
revised Tony scenario above, can be legally and ethically justifiable.  
Legal perspective 
Our argument is that first, there is no legally relevant distinction between providing palliative care to 
manage the symptoms of a refusal to eat and drink and other situations where palliative care can be 
lawfully provided.  Second, the addition of palliative care need not alter the position relating to 
criminal responsibility discussed above that respecting a competent refusal to eat and drink is 
lawful. 
Palliative care is lawful for refusals to eat and drink 
Palliative care may be lawfully provided to a patient as they approach death to manage their pain 
and symptoms.  Brightwater Care Group v Rossiter43 makes clear that this position does not change 
just because the death is occurring due to a refusal of treatment:44 
There are a number of general principles which can be confidently stated in relation to this 
issue. The first is that the legal rights and obligations relating to the provision of palliative 
care are unaffected by the circumstance that the occasion for the provision of that care 
comes about as a consequence of Mr Rossiter's withdrawal of consent to the continuing 
provision of other medical treatment, namely, the provision of nutrition and hydration. Put 
another way, Dr Benstead's rights and obligations with respect to the provision of palliative 
care to Mr Rossiter if and when he directs Brightwater to discontinue the provision of 
nutrition and hydration are no different to the obligations which attend the treatment of 
any other patient who may be approaching death.   
Similarly, it would be lawful (as well as good and acceptable medical practice) to relieve the suffering 
of a person dying from a valid refusal of blood transfusion, such as a Jehovah’s Witness.  It is the fact 
of the suffering that is relevant, not its origin. 
Mr Rossiter, therefore, was entitled to the same palliative care to ease his dying process even 
though the symptoms and the need for that care arose due to his refusal of artificial nutrition and 
hydration.  Indeed, it was clear from the judgment and the declaration made by the judge that he 
expected (and hoped) Mr Rossiter would be provided with palliative care. As a matter of logic, this 
position must also hold for the refusal of food and water (not just nutrition and hydration provided 
artificially) as the decision to refuse to eat and drink is protected in the same way and for the same 
reasons by the law. And the failure to receive either could be expected to cause equal suffering. 
Further support for this proposition can be gleaned from three other cases where the issue of 
palliative care to deal with the symptoms of treatment refusal was raised during the course of 
proceedings but not seen as unlawful.  In H Ltd v J,45 a case which involved a refusal of food and 
water and not artificial nutrition and hydration, the judge contemplated that palliative care would be 
given to manage pain and symptoms and this was not flagged as being problematic.  (We note 
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though that insulin was also being refused.) If such conduct were to be unlawful, one would expect a 
judge to have grappled with such a concern before granting declarations that respecting refusals of 
food and water (and insulin) would be lawful.  Likewise in the case of Australian Capital Territory v 
JT,46 the declaration sought was that it would be lawful to act on an adult’s refusal of food and water 
and provide only palliative care.  Although the declaration was not granted on the facts of the case, 
the Supreme Court made no adverse comment about the general lawfulness of such an approach.  
Finally, in Re JS,47 where a competent adult was refusing mechanical ventilation that was keeping 
him alive, the New South Wales Supreme Court also made no adverse comment about the 
lawfulness of palliative care to manage symptoms associated with the cessation of treatment.  The 
Court did decline to grant a declaration that the provision of such care would be lawful but this was 
because it would not be appropriate to prescribe the limits of JS’s future care rather than concerns 
about lawfulness.  
We note that this consistent approach to palliative care for patients refusing to eat and drink would 
mean that it would be lawful for that palliative care to hasten death provided the intention was to 
relieve pain. While there is some variation around Australia (some States being governed by the 
common law and others by statute), the provision of appropriate palliative care that intends to 
relieve pain and not cause death is lawful48 and this would also be the case for VPS. 
Addition of palliative care does not give rise to other criminal responsibility 
Even if the administration of palliative care to manage the symptoms of a refusal to eat and drink is 
lawful as if it had been provided to deal with symptoms of refusing medical treatment, it might still 
be argued that the addition of palliative care alters the general principles of criminal responsibility 
that were discussed above.  In other words, while refusing to eat and drink is lawful and that refusal 
must be respected, does the provision of palliative care in this situation change the nature of that 
interaction between patient and care providers such that criminal responsibility might arise? 
Here we return to the revised scenario of Tony Nicklinson to crystallise the sort of case we are 
considering. He is dying from starvation and/or dehydration and starts to feel discomfort, then pain 
and suffering. He is then provided with palliative care to manage that pain and those symptoms as 
they arise until he dies.   
In terms of the law related to assisted suicide, the same main hurdle for prosecutors mentioned 
above would arise.  If refusing food and water is not suicide, those providing palliative care, with the 
intention of providing symptom relief rather than hastening death, in ‘assistance’ of that aim, cannot 
be assisting a suicide.  This is made clear in the quote from H Ltd v J49 above.  We note though that 
there was an alternative or ‘back-up’ ground advanced in that case.  The judge stated that even if he 
was wrong and it was suicide, merely respecting a competent refusal falls short of the required 
encouragement to constitute aiding and abetting and so no criminal offence is committed.  This 
reasoning might not apply where palliative care is being provided.  There is an argument that 
offering palliation could constitute some kind of encouragement in the sense that the patient might 
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not be prepared to refuse to eat and drink without the availability of palliative care.  That said, the 
judge in H Ltd v J50made clear that this second line of reasoning was advanced as a back-up to the 
main proposition that refusing to eat and drink is not suicide in legal terms.  If that first argument is 
accepted, and we think it should be, then the addition of palliative care does not alter the criminal 
responsibility discussed above.  
The other area of potential liability identified earlier was in relation to causing death through the 
failure to provide the necessaries of life.  The addition of palliative care does not change the above 
analysis.  It is the competent refusal to eat and drink that relieves carers of this duty and the 
addition of further care does not alter any responsibilities in this regard.  And questions of causing 
the death in the scenario we have proposed would also not arise.  As noted above, appropriate 
palliative care intended to relieve pain – as it clearly is in the revised Tony scenario – does not give 
rise to criminal responsibility even if an unintended consequence is to hasten death. 
This is not to say, however, that a refusal to eat and drink coupled with palliative care could never 
give rise to liability. The criminal law is inevitably interacting with a particular situation and set of 
facts and it is possible to consider other scenarios where the combination of palliative care with a 
decision to refuse to eat and drink could change the nature of the parties’ conduct and 
corresponding responsibility. One such instance might be where the clear intention of the palliative 
care is to cause death immediately and not merely to relieve pain and suffering. That said, the types 
of cases we are discussing, as illustrated by the revised Tony scenario, remain within the law and 
palliative care can be provided to ameliorate the suffering that refusing to eat and drink can give rise 
to. VPS can be lawful and so is a legal option available to those wishing to die comfortably who are 
not terminally ill or dependent on life-sustaining medical treatment. 
Ethical considerations 
When considering the ethics of providing palliative care to a competent patient who has chosen to 
die through cessation of eating and drinking, we identify two connected but separate issues.  The 
first is whether it is ethical for doctors to provide clinical support to a patient who is seeking to die in 
this way.  The second issue arises only if we conclude that it is ethical to provide that support, and it 
is whether an individual doctor should be required to provide such support.  We consider each issue 
in turn. 
As to the first, we argue that it is ethical for doctors to provide palliative care. To recap on our earlier 
argument, we claimed that it is ethical for a competent person to refuse to eat and drink even if that 
decision results in death, because a person has a fundamental right not to have their body violated 
or invaded without their consent.  It follows, as we have also explained, that doctors are morally 
required to respect competent refusals of medical treatment and refusals to eat and drink.   
What then are the ethical implications of providing palliative care to such a patient?  Many 
commentators over the past two decades have argued that for patients who have expressed a wish 
to die by not eating or drinking, the provision of palliative care should be seen as part of the health 
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professional’s role as a caregiver.51  Support for dying through stopping food and fluid, while not 
universal,52 has been expressed from both medical53 and nursing54 perspectives.   
We agree, and regard the provision of palliative care to a patient dying as a result of a decision not 
to eat or drink as ethically sound.  Respect for autonomy entails respecting a person’s desire to live 
and die in their own way.  When the choice to die causes suffering, doctors have a professional 
obligation to relieve that suffering, for example by the provision of palliative care. Reasons not to 
provide medical care include that it is unlawful, a competent patient validly refuses it, it is itself 
harmful, or otherwise not cost-effective and so precluded by principles of distributive justice. But 
palliative care to relieve the suffering of self-chosen dying is none of these. Doctors ought to provide 
it. 
Some might object that medical care should not be provided to those who inflict their suffering upon 
themselves. However, this would preclude much of current medical care: provision of care to 
smokers, alcoholics, obese people, those who engage in risky activities (including sexual activities), 
those who harm themselves through physical violence, and so on. Clearly doctors have an obligation 
to relieve suffering, whether or not it was self-inflicted.  
The second ethical issue relates to the nature of the doctor’s obligation.  If we accept that it is 
ethical for doctors to provide palliative care to a patient who is dying in these circumstances, are 
they morally required to provide palliation? It is important here to distinguish between moral 
obligations and moral requirements. A moral obligation stipulates something there is a moral reason 
to do: what a person ought to or should do. A moral requirement stipulates something a person 
must do, on pain of legal or social sanction. For example, we ought to be more concerned about 
global inequality, poverty and climate change but we are not required to make significant sacrifices, 
such as giving up larger proportions of income, for these causes. 
We have argued above that doctors have an obligation to relieve suffering.  However, to say that 
something ought to be done is not to say that it must be done (that it is morally required). Some 
doctors will, understandably, refuse to be complicit in what they regard as killing. They will 
conscientiously object to assisting the patient to die. Thus doctors might legitimately decide not to 
support a dying patient who has chosen to die by providing palliative care or other medical 
treatment if they believe that person is acting for bad reasons. However, we have argued that VPS is 
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not unlawful and that it should be permissible within medical practice.  And where there are a range 
of permissible practices (such as VPS), doctors do have a minimal obligation to respect autonomy by 
directing a patient to other practitioners who might take a different view of the request. 
Conscientious objection has limits and requires referral on, where a practice has been deemed 
lawful and generally permissible in medicine.55  
Whether a doctor should morally accede to such a request in a jurisdiction where providing 
assistance is lawful turns on whether the person has a good reason to die. Existential suffering, 
ageing, loss of one’s ideals could all be good reasons to die, in certain circumstances.56  
Conclusion  
In this paper we have argued that it is both lawful and ethical to respect lethal refusals to eat and 
drink.  This proposition is neither legally nor ethically controversial.  We have further argued that it 
can be both lawful and ethical to provide palliative care to reduce the suffering associated with such 
self-induced dying.  This second argument is more controversial, yet an important one to have in 
light of the ongoing debate about whether competent adults should be entitled to assistance to die, 
and the ongoing resistance of Australian parliaments to enact laws that allow assistance to be given.  
There is widespread but not unanimous community support to reform the law to allow assistance in 
dying.  But there would be unanimous support for the proposition that a person should not die 
suffering and in pain.  A lawful and ethical model (voluntary palliated starvation) to achieve this end 
is therefore worth considering. 
The VPS model presents an opportunity for that cohort for whom end of life decision-making 
frameworks have struggled to assist – individuals who are sick (whether or not they are terminally ill) 
and in pain, but not dependent on life-sustaining treatment.  The model would also be an option for 
elderly people who are ‘tired of living’ and autonomously choose to die while they still have a quality 
of life that is acceptable to them (as in the case of Lisette Nigot). These groups cannot lawfully 
receive assistance to die in any jurisdiction which has enacted laws to facilitate voluntary euthanasia 
and assisted suicide.   
It should be remembered that we are not requiring palliative care physicians or other doctors to 
provide the palliative care – only that they should be allowed to.  And there can exist good moral 
reasons to ground a moral obligation to provide palliative support to those who choose to die for 
good reasons. There are also good reasons not to require doctors to engage in medical practices if 
they cause distress to doctors: these doctors may not perform the service adequately, and there are 
sufficient other doctors to provide the necessary palliative support.  If there are insufficient doctors 
and other health professionals to provide palliative support to those who choose to die, we may 
need to readdress the extent of professional obligations to relieve the suffering of self-induced 
dying. 
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Taking as our starting point the famous case of Tony Nicklinson, we have argued that VPS is both 
ethically justifiable according to current medical ethics and within what is already permitted by law.  
If we adopt the currently accepted position that a competent adult should be able to refuse to eat 
and drink, why then should deaths that occur in this way be painful?  Some may argue that VPS is a 
step too far but if we take existing rights seriously, it is hard to argue why a lawful death through 
refusing to eat and drink should occur in pain.   
VPS is not ideal as a mode of dying. It requires courage and determination – it is not for everyone. 
There is the possibility of being declared incompetent and forcibly treated.  There is the possibility of 
not receiving, or receiving inadequate, palliative care and subsequently suffering. People 
entertaining the option of VPS need to be aware of these possibilities and take steps to minimise 
their happening, for example, receiving in advance the assurances that their wishes will be 
respected. While VPS is likely to be an option accepted by the medical profession in cases of 
terminal illness, it is likely to be more unpopular when requested for non-terminal conditions. Since 
patients cannot demand medical treatment, it is likely to be more difficult to secure and people 
should ensure they have a willing physician to provide palliative care.  
VPS has other shortcomings. It involves slow dying and many people wishing to die and many 
families will yearn for a quick death.  And lastly, practising VPS may lead some to think that it 
renders legal reform around dying unnecessary, sapping political and social will to introduce 
voluntary euthanasia and/or physician assisted suicide legislation. 
In our view, this latter concern need not arise. The difficulties identified with VPS mean that it should 
only be a part of a comprehensive approach to assisted dying.  In fact, that VPS is currently lawful 
and ethical should add weight to calls for reform and it can be seen as a bridge to the legalisation of 
voluntary euthanasia and/or physician assisted suicide. We had no choice over how or when we 
entered this world but we can and should exercise choice over how and when we leave it. 
